As in other countries, the Spanish upper chamber is facing harsh criticisms. It has failed to fulfil its constitutional task as a chamber of territorial representation.
Introduction
Upper chambers form a central issue in studies of federalism (Money and Tsebelis, 1992: 25-43; Riker, 1992: 101-116) . In contrast to unitary states, federal upper chambers represent a forum for the representation of territories (as in the United States) and/or minorities (as in India). Through different systems of appointment (e.g., direct and indirect elections, co-option) federal bicameralism usually allows the accommodation of tensions between individual and collective rights. The creation of an institutional framework able to represent collective interests through a specific territorial chamber (with or without veto powers) is considered as a step towards the resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts that considerably lowers the transaction costs of bilateral negotiations (Benz and Broschek, 2013) . However, as stressed by Sartori (1994) , Kymlicka (2009: 109-148) and Behnke (2013: 459-469) , federalism is, at the same time, both the solution to territorial tensions and the cause of those conflicts. By transferring competences and resources to minority representatives, federalism tends sometimes to amplify their claims for autonomy or independence.
Upper chambers typically deal with tensions stemming from centralising pressures coming from national executive bodies and decentralising forces from peripheral governments. This phenomenon has generated a series of debates about the role of the Senate in countries such as Germany and Australia (Swenden, 2004) . In recent years, some federal countries have undergone reforms of their upper chambers to improve or restrict the representation of their inner plurality.
1 At the same time, a number of unitary 1 For example, the 2011 reform of the Senate in Belgium amplified the powers and the mechanisms of the appointment of Belgian senators. The designation moved to a system of indirect election within languagebased communities to amplify the decentralisation of that polity. On the contrary, Canada is a good states, such as Croatia, Sweden and Denmark, have eliminated their upper chambers. In sum, the reform of upper chambers is on the agenda of several governments, even if it is difficult to implement (Russell, 2001: 442-461) .
Historically speaking, Spain has been a bicameral State since 1837 (Paniagua, 1997: 410-422 Russell and Sandford (2002: 79-89) , we identify elements such as constitutional rigidity, vested interests or the attitude of governments that can constitute powerful obstacles to reforming the upper chambers. This article sets out to explain this institutional deadlock in the Spanish case.
The article presents three different approaches to explain this impasse. Firstly, institutionalist authors stress the importance of the inheritance in Spanish politics. These scholars argue that the legal difficulties in reforming the 1978 Constitution present an example of an English-speaking majoritarian state where a French-speaking minority from Quebec has received constitutional recognition, leading to the transfer of specific rights. Nevertheless, despite the decision adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1998 that obliged federal states to guarantee the representation of minorities, including the non-territorialised ones, the federal government refused to modify the mode of designation of Canadian senators (Lecours and Béland, 2013: 93-113 ).
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The exceptions being Primo de Rivera's dictatorship , the Second Republic (1931-39), Francoism (1939-75) and the transition to Democracy (1976-79). obstacle course that only a super-majority could overcome. But such a super-majority is hard to mobilise with a proportional electoral system, even one often producing majoritarian outcomes such as in post-transition Spain. Secondly, drawing on the sociology of party organizations, failure to reform might be interpreted as the outcome of the vested interests in maintaining the status quo by the two main parties. Since there are organic connections between the internal apparatus of the main parties and the representative institutions they have occupied since the transition (Coller, 1999: 193-221 Sociológicas, 2011) . We explain the current stalemate by stressing the existence of a Spanish version of the joint-decision trap dilemma.
The article is divided into three sections. Section one sets up the research question, presenting the problems of legitimacy faced by the Senate in the Spanish political system. Section two explains the failed attempts at reforming the chamber. Section three deals with the three competing explanations for the blocked reform before concluding with some theoretical comments.
I. A problem of legitimacy

A biased representation
The first bias of the Senate is the problem of electoral constituencies. This chamber currently includes 266 members: 208 are elected directly by popular vote and 58 are appointed by the regional assemblies. According to the Constitution, the 208 directly elected senators are returned in multi-member constituencies based on the provinces, with elections held every four years on the same day as those for the members of the (United Nations, 2014) . This contradiction tends to undermine the role of territorial representation of the Senate as assigned by the Constitution.
A limited power of policy-making
As observed in other countries, the second limitation faced by the Senate is its lack of legislative power (Patterson and Mughan, 2001: 39-60 confidence or a motion of censure. Such a situation of imbalance between the two chambers has been described as an 'attenuated bicameralism' (Soto Carmona, 1998: 24-57 ) and has made the Senate a rubber stamp chamber with almost no power (Maurer, 1999: 25-45) .
In these conditions, the capacity of the Senate to articulate territorial issues is extremely limited, and minority representatives have been quite reluctant to use the upper chamber to express their claims. Conversely, cultural or territorial minorities as well as regional governments have found functional equivalents to the Senate as alternative fora to voice their demands and advance their own interests, such as the Congress of Deputies, the Constitutional Court or the sectoral conferences and bilateral commissions (Agranoff, 1993: 1-28; Moreno, 2001) . Consequently, the Senate has lost an opportunity to reinforce its role as a key institution in a multinational federal democracy. 7 The Senate can appoint some members of key institutions, such as the Constitutional Court (art. 159), as well as proposing parliamentarian initiatives to the Cortes Generales. As a second legislative chamber, the Senate sometimes introduces some very marginal changes to bills and is frequently presented as a forum designed to moderate the proposals of the Executive and Congress.
Public opinion between ignorance and criticism
Despite 
II. Thirty years of failed reforms
Towards an asymmetrical federalism?
There have been a number of (failed) initiatives to transform the upper chamber. From a programmatic perspective, when talking about the reform of the Senate, three broad interest coalitions can be identified. The first one is the alliance led by the main peripheral nationalist parties, such as the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) and the Catalan Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU). These parties believe that the Senate should aim to reflect the hecho diferencial, that is, the national specificities of cultural minorities.
In 1998, CiU submitted a reform for reshaping the Senate through a multi-tiered system, in which the 'historical' nationalities (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country) would enjoy a specific veto power over legislation affecting their regions. This first group would have been followed by a second cluster made up of regions with a special status (Navarre, Andalusia, the Balearic and Canary Islands), and by a third cluster, grouping the rest of the autonomous communities. This two-step proposal generated significant controversy and was finally abandoned; partly because of the parliamentary alliance between the CiU and the conservative People's Party (Partido Popular, PP) and partly because of the criticisms of the Navarrese, Andalusian, Balearic and Canarian regional leaders who were excluded from policymaking (Vigala Foruria, 2013: 63-82) .
Towards multilateralism?
Leftist groups (like the Spanish Worker Socialist Party -Partido Socialista Obrero Español, and United Left, Izquierda Unida -IU) advocate, with more intensity than others, the conversion of the Senate into a territorial chamber in a federal system. 
Towards centralisation?
Lastly, conservatives (PP) favour a modified version of the status quo, whereby the existing Senate would remain, but would acquire veto powers on issues relating to the autonomous communities. In this zero-sum game, the rise of the 'autonomies' is 
III. Explaining reform failures
The inheritance argument
In a seminal paper, Elisa Roller (2002: 69-92) Last but not least, the inheritance argument also draws on the specific political conditions of the democratic transition in Spain. Authors influenced by historical new institutionalism have pointed to the importance of political bargaining during the crafting of the Constitution to explain the current design of Spanish institutions (Roller, 2002: 69-92; Ferri Durá, 2009 The final outcome of the complex negotiations was the creation of a mixed political system with an upper chamber combining centralising elements and federal features.
Good or bad, this institutional design was produced after a process of cross-party bargaining among political forces that agreed to deliberate on the new rules of the game.
But such conditions of cross-party debate have been difficult to sustain in posttransition Spain. The Spanish political system has been converted into a majoritarian polity over the years; as a result, the consensual re-shaping of institutions is highly improbable (Hopkin, 2005: 6-26 ).
For these three reasons, the diagnostic of the inheritance argument is plainly accurate. The reform of the Senate is complex and it depends heavily on the rise of a 
The party bargain argument
The second interpretative framework is influenced by the sociology of party organisations and centres on the symbiotic relations between political parties and 9 Previously, Article 13.2 of the Constitution had been reformed in 1992 to allow European foreign citizens living in Spain to participate in municipal elections.
representative institutions (Barnes et al., 1985: 695-720; Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999: 307-339 
The joint-decision trap argument
The third argument for explaining the blockage of Senate reform is the existence of a Spanish version of the joint-decision trap dilemma. 12 In short, the incompatibility between the party proposals and the existence of veto players impedes any relevant modification of the status quo. While a large majority of relevant decision-makers agree on the need for a change, they disagree on important details. As a survey of parliamentary elites shows (Table 2) , the vast majority of regional and State deputies and senators (80%) prefer to keep the upper chamber but transform it into a territorial chamber of representation; around 8% prefer to keep the Senate, giving it veto powers in matters related to the autonomous regions; 7% of politicians want to abolish the Senate, and a minority (3.5%) prefers the status quo. Those who were not in favour of eliminating the Senate were asked how they would prefer to elect senators in the future. Indirectly, this is also a way of detecting the functions attributed to the upper chamber: those who think that senators should be elected by regional parliaments or governments understand that the Senate should be a territorial chamber of representation, while those who opt for keeping the current election system are in favour of the status quo.
Table 3 about here
The favourite option of politicians is the current situation (52%) followed by the general election option without interference from regional institutions (34%) (see Table   3 ). There are some relevant differences according to parties or blocks of parties since the statistical significance of chi-square indicates that there is an association between party and options for electing senators. It seems that the large national governing parties -PP and PSOE -have a majority of members of parliament (MPs) favouring the status quo (60% and 52%, respectively) while the majority of IU (55%) and regional elected officials (44%) prefer to transfer the responsibility of electing senators directly to the citizens rather than maintaining the status quo or allowing regional institutions to nominate senators. Compared with national parties, peripheral nationalists (30%) and regionalists (25%) show large proportions of MPs favouring the election of senators by regional parliaments or governments, although both groups of MPs prefer the transfer of responsibility of elections to citizens (39% and 44%, respectively). The fact that the majority of PP and PSOE MPs favour the status quo shows that the resistance to change lies with the two major parties.
A way of assessing the relevance of the Senate for elected MPs (those who would be in charge of reforming the institution) as a chamber of territorial representation is to ask about the type of electoral district politicians would favour in the case of senators being elected by all citizens (the second preferred option, as can be seen in Table 3) rather than by regional chambers or regional governments. Although deputies and senators are almost equally divided between the region and the province as the final electoral district, a small majority of them (54%) believe that the province, not the region, would be an adequate district.
Table 4 about here
The differences among parties do not occur by chance and data in Table 4 All in all, the large majority of MPs would make the Senate a chamber of territorial representation in which senators would be elected by a system similar to the current one (a mixture of citizens' election and designation by regional chambers). The majority of representatives would strengthen the territorial dimension of the Senate. However, the logic of this position is diluted, since the electoral district would be the province, rather than the region, thus reducing the incentives to create regional platforms to compete in elections. Lack of consensus on these relevant issues and, especially, the resistance to change among MPs from the large national parties (PP and PSOE), prevents the success of attempts at reforming the Senate.
In an institutional context where every player can use his/her veto power, the ideological incompatibility between the different political parties' proposals for reorganising the upper chamber is so deep that a consensual decision is out of reach.
Therefore, only lowest common denominator solutions can be reached. In contrast to the other interpretations, the joint-decision trap framework has the advantage of shedding a new light on two interrelated phenomena. On one hand, it allows an explanation of the deadlock impeding the reform of the Senate. Political parties -and especially the biggest ones (but not only) -have perfectly integrated the rules of the game designed during the transition. Accordingly, they have adapted their behaviour to the new institutional context by using the Senate for internal purposes. This is why the PP, the PSOE and to a certain extent the PNV and CiU exert their veto power in the Congress and the Senate in order to limit the scope of reform proposals. On the other hand, the concept of 'least common denominator' bargaining also allows an understanding of the incremental modifications of the upper chamber such as the creation of the General Commission for Autonomous Communities or the translation office for regional languages.
Conclusion
Since its creation during the transition, the Spanish Senate has been shown to be a poor institution for representing territorial interests. Its diminishing performance in terms of representation, policy-making and public opinion raises the possibility of institutional reform. Nevertheless, such a reform has been delayed to date. This paper aimed to understand the roots of this institutional blockage.
Firstly, from a historical new-institutionalist perspective, the democratic transition's constitutional agreements produced a strong path dependency effect that impeded any modification of the initial design of the regime for almost 40 years. This point of view is interesting but, after the rapid reform of the constitution achieved in 2011 -though exceptional and led under external pressure -it failed to provide a convincing causal relationship to explain why the reform of the Senate remained impossible for so many years. Drawing on the sociology of party organisation, a second argument stressed the symbiotic relationship between the Senate -understood as a resource provider -and the apparatus of the main political parties (PP and PSOE). According to this perspective, and outsiders (trying to modify the rules of entrance).
The favoured argument of this paper completes the first two. It contends that the blocked reform of the Senate can be best understood as a case of the joint-decision trap.
In accordance with the inheritance argument, rules constrain actors' strategies; and in Source Authors' elaboration from CIS (2012) 13 The total sample of citizens is 2,478, and 31% are recorded as Do not know/Did not answer. The wording of the question was: 'in the case of all senators being elected by citizens, do you think the electoral district should be the region or the province?' Chi-square is 47.343 and its significance (p value) is 0.000. Chi-square is higher (51.616) but its significance remains at 0.000 when peripheral nationalists are divided into Catalan, Basque and Galician peripheral nationalist parties. 
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